Ethnic Discrimination in the Greek Labour Market: Occupational Access, Insurance Coverage, and Wage Offers by Minas Vlassis & Nick Drydakis
 
 
Ethnic Discrimination in the Greek Labour Market: 















The paper investigates whether low skilled male Albanians face unequal treatment in 
the Greek labour market, two years after the national adoption of the European anti-
discrimination employment legislation. By means of a Correspondence Test we have 
estimated that Albanians face 43.5% net discrimination of access to occupations. 
Concentrating on the equal chance cases, we subsequently found that Albanians face 
36.5% less chance of being registered with insurance coverage, while their potential 
wage contracts are on the average 8.8% below those of Greeks, and 5.3% below the 
legal minimum wage. As it comes to the reasons for wage discrimination, using an 
indirect approach we interestingly found that the employers themselves “put the 
blame” on profit strategies (84.4%), on statistical discrimination (9.6%), and on taste 
discrimination (7.8%).   
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1. Introduction  
There is significant literature across social sciences, which analyzes 
discrimination in labour markets on the grounds of race and ethnicity. In Greece, 
however, little work has been done in measuring discrimination and what we do know 
comes mainly from national observatories. The scope of this paper is to measure the 
existence of racial discrimination in the Greek private market, two years after the 
national adoption of the European anti-discrimination employment legislation 
(2005/3304).  
Racial/ethnic discrimination has been a particular focus of recent efforts by 
European lawmakers, at least in part to the dramatic growth of racism in Europe 
following the end of Communism. We are particularly interested in investigating 
whether male Albanians
1  face discriminatory treatment in the labour market, 
compared to Greeks, and to evaluate whether stereotypes prejudice the Greek 
employers’ screening processes.  
Due to the absence of standardized economic data we employ the 
Correspondence Test method in order to isolate the ethnic discrimination trend for a 
specific period. The correspondence test is used for detecting discrimination in the 
preliminary stage of the selection process, which for the ethnic minorities is seen to be 
the most crucial barrier to the labour market. A typical correspondence test entails that 
the researcher sends two equal - in human capital- applications (CV’s), to advertised 
job openings. The only characteristic that differs between the two (pseudo) 
applications is the ethnicity of the candidates. Ethnic discrimination is then measured 
by the difference in the number of call backs for interview between the two ethnic 
groups. The main advantage of this approach is that one can get direct measurements 
of the employers’ attitudes
2.  
In our study we extend this test by gathering data concerning insurance 
coverage registrations to the Social Security Organization (IKA) as well as wage 
                                                 
1It was not until the collapse of the communist Albanian government in 1991 that Greece experienced 
the first flows of immigration. Ten years later around the 60% of immigrants in Greece are from 
Albania (Greek Census, 2001).  
2Following Adam Barry (1981), we assume that employers by offering an interview are indicative of 
their willingness to consider applicants employable. 
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offers, in cases of positive responses. At this instance, in contrast to the customary 
methods of interview data and wage decomposition, we choose the correspondence 
test for two reasons: First, because interview data is a rather biased method, since 
native (migrant) workers may overstate (understate) their position in the labour 
market. Whilst, researchers can with the correspondence test themselves act as 
workers and record the reality. Second, because Census data concerning migrant 
wages are not available, in Greece. While, even in countries where such data are 
available,
3 wage decomposition has been subject to considerable criticism as it is 
thought to be a biased method for discrimination tests
4.  
Thus, our study examines labour market discrimination by essentially using 
experimental data. Concentrating on low skilled workers our sample particularly 
refers to: (a) office jobs, (b) factory jobs, (c) café and restaurant services and (d) shop 
sales. Our findings provide strong evidence for discrimination against Albanians in all 
three dimensions. Albanians face 43.5% less chance of access to occupations. More 
interestingly, concentrating on the 49.7% equal chance cases of access to occupations, 
we found that Albanians face 36.5% less chance of being registered with insurance 
coverage, while their potential wage contracts are 8.8% below those of Greeks, and 
5.3% below the legal minimum wage. Last, but not least, in order to evaluate the 
reasons for wage discrimination, we appealed to the most appropriate group to judge: 
The employers who defined the outcome. Using an indirect method, we found that the 
factors contributing to wage inequality are the firms’ profit strategies (accounting for 
the 84.4% of the total), followed by ambiguities concerning Albanians’ productivity 
(9.6%), whilst a “dislike” against Albanians accounts only for the 7.8%.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we sketch out 
the phenomenon of ethnic discrimination in the European labour market, as well as 
the recent anti-discrimination legislation, and we briefly review the theoretical 
explanations of labour market discrimination. In the third section we report various 
forms of discriminatory contracts in the Greek labour market and we present the 
                                                 
3Various economists have attempted to offer economic explanations for the phenomenon of ethnic 
discrimination in wages, drawing largely on the U.S. Black and White experiences
 (Altonji and Black, 
1999; Cain, 1986; Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973). Regressions show that ethnic minority groups earn 
less than the majority native workers. 
4Wage decomposition combines the estimated coefficients for national wages and the values of the 
explanatory variables for ethnic workers. The criticism involves around the specifications of the model 
and the choice of independent variables. There is no conclusive proof of discrimination as long as all 
other possible relevant variables have not been identified (Bovenkerk, 1992). 
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model encapsulating our investigating relationships. In the fourth section we describe 
the methodology and the application structure of our investigation. In the fifth section 
we present and evaluate the field results of our correspondence test, regarding 
occupational access for Greek and Albanian workers, as well as regarding wage 
discrimination. In the sixth section we present the methodology, application, and 
results of our second experiment concerning the factors which account for wage 
discrimination.The last section concludes.  
 
2. Ethnic Discrimination, Legislation, and Theoretical Explanations 
Discrimination is complex, multifaceted and deeply ingrained in behaviour, 
and difficult to measure or quantify
5. Discrimination is understood to exist when 
some superficial characteristic is used in an attempt to restrict individuals’ access to 
the available economic, political, and social opportunities for advancement (D’Amico, 
1987). The targeted discrimination groups may vary, across locations, but in general 
include: women, immigrants, roma, youth, elderly, children, disabled, gay and 
lesbian, bisexual, transgender and transsexual people
6.  
In the European labour market most vulnerable to racial/ethnic discrimination 
seem to be Third World nationals, migrants, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants 
and Geneva Convention refugees. Complaints concerning employment refer mainly to 
wages, payments of overtime, recruitment, contracts, racial harassment, and 
promotions
7 . Migrants from non-European Union (EU) countries, and certain 
autochthonous minority groups, display much lower participation and employment 
rates than the natives’ or the migrants’ from the E.U.
8 On the other hand, however, 
anti-discrimination policy is an important part of the Union’s approach to 
immigration, inclusion, integration and employment.  The inclusion of Article 13 in 
the European Community Treaty, following the entry into force of the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty, empowered the Union to deal with discrimination on a range of 
                                                 
5See McConnell, Brue and Macpherson (2006). 
6According to the Eurobarometer survey based on questionnaire covered by the Community Action 
Programme against Discrimination (57.0, 2003), in the 15 Member States, the most often cited for 
witnessed discrimination is racial or ethnic 22%, followed by learning difficulties or mental illness 
12%, physical disability 11%, religion or beliefs 9%, age and sexual orientation each 6%. 
7According to a questionnaire conducted by the European Trade Union Confederation (2003), almost 
twenty-one, out of twenty-four, national trade unions surveyed agreed that migrants and ethnic 
minorities face higher levels of unemployment, lower pay and slower promotion. 
8For the year 2005 the share of non EU 25 nationals in population is 6%. The unemployment rate of 
non EU 25 nationals is 17% against 9% for the EU nationals and their employment rate is 55% against 
65% (Eurostat Labour Force Participation). 
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grounds, including racial/ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual 
orientation. That development in turn led, in 2000, to the unanimous adoption by the 
Council of two directives, the Racial Directive (2000/43), and the Employment 
Equality Directive (2000/78), both aiming to ensure that everybody living in the E.U. 
can benefit from effective legal protection against discrimination
9. Greece, as an 
instance, by adopting the two Directives in January 2005 (2005/3304), made labour 
market discrimination a legally prohibited act.  
The theoretical explanations of labour market discrimination are concerned 
with how and why productively irrelevant characteristics influence the labour market 
behavior of employers and workers (Swinton, 1977). There is not, however, a 
generally accepted economic theory of discrimination, while there are a variety of 
reasons for it: 
The  taste hypothesis (Becker, 1957; 1971) envisions discrimination as a 
preference (or taste) for which the discriminator is willing to pay. In particular, the 
employers’ taste for discrimination is based on the idea that they want to maintain a 
physical or social distance from certain groups. Employers are then willing to 
sacrifice profits, by paying higher wages than they need to, or by accepting workers 
less qualified than others they could recruit at the same wage. The trouble with this 
explanation is that it contradicts in a direct way the usual view of employers as profit-
maximizers
10.  
The Marxist approach (Baran and Sweezy, 1966) views racism as a tactic used 
by employers to introduce class cleavages within the working class. Economic gain 
rather than psychic preference is then the main motive for discrimination. Wage 
discrimination simply pays in terms of maximizing profits. Jobs are organized to take 
wage advantage of ethnic workers, and the tactic is intended to minimize labour costs, 
                                                 
9In particular, Directive 78 applies to a range of grounds, including racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, age, disability and sexual orientation (regarding both the public and private sectors), in relation 
to: (a) Conditions for access to employment, to self-employment and to occupation, selection criteria 
and recruitment conditions, whatever is the branch of activity and the level of the professional 
hierarchy (including promotion). (b) Access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, 
vocational training, advanced vocational training and retraining, including practical work experience. 
(c) Employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay, (d) Membership of and 
involvement in an organization of workers or employers, or any organization whose members carry on 
a particular profession, including the benefits provided for by such organizations. Directive 43 applies 
only to racial or ethnic origin and includes all the above cases (a)-(d) and further it enforcement to: (e) 
Social protection, including social security and health care. (f) Social advantages. (g) Education. (h) 
Access to the supply of goods and services which are available to the public (including housing). 
10In a perfectly competitive market, each worker is paid the marginal revenue product of his/her labour. 
If a worker is paid less implies discrimination. 
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by weakening the workers’ bargaining position, or perhaps to stall the worker- 
stemming long-run threat to the capitalistic system. Employers’ well being is 
therefore improved as they are able to raise their expected incomes through 
discrimination. 
The idea that competition may eventually eliminate discrimination led to the 
development of the statistical discrimination hypothesis (Arrow, 1972, 1973; Phelps, 
1972; Aigner and Clain, 1977). Discrimination results from the profit maximizing 
response of employers to uncertainty about the quality of individual workers, while 
the real or subjective distributions favour the group which receives preferences. 
Stereotyping plays the major role in this approach. Statistical models of 
discrimination predict that if employers perceive minorities as being generally less 
productive than majorities, and if it is difficult to measure the actual workers’ 
productivity, then minorities with above-average productivity may receive below-
average returns. 
Finally, an alternative explanation for wage discrimination is more recently 
given, in a Union-Oligopoly context (Drydakis and Vlassis, 2006). If union members 
possess different reservation wages, unions may offer to firms the option to 
discriminate firm-specific wages across equally-skilled employees and by that to 
achieve lower costs which lead to higher profits.  
 
3. Uninsured Employment and Ethnic Discrimination in the Greek Labour 
Market 
3.1 Various forms of discriminatory contracts  
The main task of social security is to offer insurance coverage to its members 
through benefits. In Greece, compulsory insurance formally starts on the very first day 
of employment, in the country’s largest Social Security Organization (IKA), which 
covers in general those in dependent employment. It meets the needs of its insured 
members in medical care and benefit payments, such as old age pensions, disability 
pensions, maternity aid, sickness-accident allowance etc.  
Employee registration with IKA implies mandatory contribution payments for 
both the employer and the employee based on employee wage levels, which cannot be 
lower than the legal minimum wage in proportion to employee characteristics. 
Uninsured employment or insured employment with inaccurate data constitute illegal 
treatment and are penalized by fines. In practice, however, illegal treatment takes the 
form of ″silent″ (or, tacit) agreements between employers and employees: Either 
  6 
employees agree to be registered with IKA only after they have certified their 
productiveness, or they are registered on condition that they have to deposit a fraction 
or the total employers’ contributions to IKA for a period. In all cases, the employers 
exploit the employees’ need for income, while firms’ costs and employees’ net 
receipts decrease with insurance contributions. Moreover, employees may be often 
registered as being less human-capital-endowed with less work experience and in 
general with few characteristics than they actually possess. Thereafter, wage level 
depends on the tacit agreement’s terms. On the other hand, those employers who 
refuse to register employees have a wider range of discriminatory wage contracts to 




3.2 Pair-wise Modeling 
The above practices imply that ethnic (or other) discrimination in the Greek 
labour market may take various forms, while its reasoning seems to fit well with any 
of the profit maximization - compatible  explanations reviewed in the previous 
section. Nonetheless, our field experiment investigates for all possible source of 
discrimination, as follows. 
First, to allow for a taste for discrimination, we want to examine whether 
ethnicity affects an applicant’s probability of receiving a job interview [ ]. To 
particularly measure whether Greek employers have a taste for discrimination against 
Albanians, following Neumark et al (1996), we define the following relationship: 
IS P
u a P IS IS + Ε + = β                                                                                                       (1) 
Where:  P   is the latente regression explaining the probability of receiving a job 
interview, and has a value of one (zero) when applicants receive an interview 
(otherwise);  I refers to the interview stage; S   refers to the sectors; a is the 
constant;β is the parameter of the ethnic variable; E  refers to the ethnicity and has a 
value of one (zero) when the candidate is a Greek (Albanian); uis the disturbance 
term. We can estimate equation (1) as a Probit model. If 0 = β  then the Greek and 
Albanian have the same probability of receiving an interview. If  0 < β  then  the 
Albanian candidate has a higher probability of receiving an interview than the Greek 
                                                 
11 See, e.g. Psimmenos and Kassimati (2004). 
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one. If  0 > β   then the Greek candidate has a higher probability of receiving an 
interview than the Albanian one. Our field experiment is designed so as, based on 
application forms, observable differences between the Greek and the Albanian 
candidate do not exist. The two candidates are identical in every respect except their 
ethnicity. Hence, E  is not correlated withu. 
Second, we are interested in whether ethnicity affects an applicant’s 
probability of being registered with insurance coverage [ ]. Here, our Probit model 
is defined by the following estimable relationship. 
BS P
u a P BS BS + Ε + = β                                                                                                      (2) 
WhereB refers to the insurance coverage stage. 
  Last, but not least, we are interested in whether ethnicity affects employee 
wage offers. For that we analogously define the following relationship. 
u W SH SH + Ε + = β α                                                                                                     (3) 
WhereW refers to the monthly wage offers and H refers to the wage offer stage.  
  Note that in all three equations no other control variables are necessary since 
the applicants are matched in all characteristics other than ethnicity.  
 
4. Correspondence Test: Methodology and Application Structure 
4.1 Methodology  
Descending the seminal paper of Riach and Rich (2002), different forms of 
field experiments have been used to test for discrimination in hiring. Due to their 
simplicity and controllability, these real-life experiments have become quite popular 
and they have been carried out in at least fifteen countries. In such an experiment, the 
term Correspondence Test particularly refers to the technique of written approaches 
for interview access to advertised vacancies
12.  
Our field experiment was conducted between May 2006 to January 2007 and 
the geographical parameters involved the major city of Greece, Athens. We had 
concentrated on low skilled vacancies, because 78% of male Albanians in Greece are 
low skilled (Greek Census, 2001). The four occupations to which we had focused on 
were: office jobs, factory jobs, café and restaurant services and shop sales. They have 
                                                 
12There are two other procedures that had been previously used to measure the extent of discrimination 
in labour market. These methods involve personal approaches, in which individuals either apply over 
telephone (Brown and Gay, 1985; Hubbuck and Carter, 1980) or they attend job interviews (Daniel, 
1968; McIntosh and Smith, 1974).  
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been chosen because, while there are many low skilled vacancies in agriculture, 
construction, cleaning, and delivery, in most those cases only telephone contact was 
available. 
Our correspondence testing is structured into three stages. At the first stage we 
are interested in measuring occupational access for Greek and Albanian workers. We 
fabricated two imaginary, equal human-capital workers, applying to the same job by 
written applications (CV’s). The two applications were posted simultaneously, within 
one day of the advertisement appearing, using fax devices. If a firm was interested 
about any of the applicants, he could be contacted, either through an available 
address, or by telephone contact. At the second stage, we are interested in gathering 
insurance coverage registrations (IKA), whilst at the third stage in gathering monthly 
wage offers. Two of our associates were trained in what to say, in the case of a 
positive call back, in order to respond equally. Taking advantage of the low status 
vacancies and the naive portfolio of employees we were enabled to address relevant 
questions directly.  
At the first stage, the employer’s response to an application was recorded as 
positive when the candidate was invited for an interview. The outcomes could be: (i) 
both applicants are invited for interview, (ii) only one is invited, and (iii) nobody is 
invited. If both applicants were invited they are considered to be treated equally. If 
neither was invited it could, at first sight, be recorded as equal treatment as well. Yet, 
in the literature, outcome (iii) is handled in two ways. Either it is considered to be a 
non-observation (Riach and Rich, 1987; 1991; Mc Intosh and Smith, 1974; 
International Labour Organization), or it is recorded as an observation of equal 
treatment (Urban Institute, 1990; Neumark, 1996). In our experiment we have 
followed the standardized ILO approach. Of course, in case (ii), where only one 
applicant was invited, a discriminatory attitude is observed.  
At the second stage, the classification of insurance coverage registration 
offered could respectively entail three outcomes: both workers will be registered (with 
IKA), only one worker will be registered, neither will be registered. If both workers 
are offered registrations, they are considered as being equally treated. If neither will 
be registered it is considered as equal treatment, and if only one worker will be 
registered, a discriminatory attitude is observed.  
  9 
As in turn regards the third stage, an employer’s response could comprise of 
only two it may outcomes. Either both workers are offered equal wages, or the wage 
offers vary across ethnicities.   
4.2 Application Structure 
The vacancies in our four occupations were found in website newspapers. We 
applied to vacancies where there was a specific demand for low skilled male workers 
for, eight-hour and five-day, employment. The qualifications and presentation style of 
the two (pseudo) applicants were matched as closely as possible, so that they were 
identical in all employment relevant characteristics but ethnicity. In each application 
we provided all the necessary information, to eliminate the possibility of statistical 
discrimination, at the preliminary stage of the hiring process. Each application was 
designed to equally convey the type of experience that might make an applicant 
attractive.  
The fictitious applications consisted of a name and last name, a mobile 
telephone number, and a postal address. In the candidates’ CVs there was a specific 
ethnicity reference. The addresses were chosen so that to be recognized as similar as 
possible, in order to indicate the same social class. Applications showed the same 
level of schooling and job experience. Both candidates have finished Greek high 
schools, approximately twelve years ago, so for the Albanian candidate the Greek 
language couldn’t be an effective constraint. Furthermore, the applicants were 29 
years old, unmarried and had carried out military service. Both had nine years of work 
experience in the same position as each vacancy applied for. To avoid detection, 
candidates’ high schools and previous workplaces were located at different areas in 
Athens. Similarly, the candidates had carried out military service in different areas. 
Finally, both had similar hobbies/interests and personal characteristics. The styles of 
CVs and cover letters were, however, different for each pair. Whereas, in order to 
control for the possibility the style of an application to influence an employer’s 
response, the application forms were allocated equally between the Greek and 
Albanian applicant. For the same reason, the applications were sent alternately to each 
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5. Field Results 
5.1 Interview Invitation  
At the first stage, by pairs of candidates and by type of jobs, six events are 
defined: nobody is invited , at least one is invited (usable test) , both are 
invited (equal treatment) , discrimination against Albanians , discrimination 
against Greeks , and net discrimination . Where, 
] [ I N ] [ I U
] [ I E ] [ I DA
] [ I DG ] [ I ND = I refers to the 
interview stage. Let the probabilities of these events be respectively indicated by: 





I ND P n z Pz / = , with  } , { I I U N z =  ;  job 
openings, and , with  .  
= n
I f U f P / = } , , , { I I I I ND DG DA E f =
The International Labour Organization defines net (ethnic) discrimination as: 
.Accordingly, if I I I ND U DG DA P
ILO / ) ( − = 0 =
I ND P the Greek and Albanian candidates 
receive equal treatment. While, if , the Albanian candidate faces lower access 





The last row of Table 1 displays our total probability results. Column (1) 
shows that in 50.8% cases neither candidate   is invited. Column (2) shows that 
in 49.1% cases at least one candidate    is invited. Column (3) shows that in 
49.7% cases Greeks and Albanians face equal treatment . Column (4) shows that 
Albanians face 46.9% discrimination , while column (5) shows that Greeks face 
3.3% discrimination as well . Nonetheless, column (6) shows that net 
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Table 1 Invitation to Interviews - Probability Results (%) - 
                  Outcomes     
                   
 
Occupations 




I N P  
(2) 
 
I U P  
(3) 
 
I E P  
(4) 
 
I DA P  
(5) 
 
I DG P  
(6) 
 









42.77  57.22 30.30 67.67 2.020  65.65  61.23* 
Factories 
217 
59.44  40.55 53.40 43.18 3.409  39.77  29.87* 
Restaurant and Café Services 
241 
48.54  51.45 67.74 28.22 4.032  24.19  22.50* 
Shop Sales 
158 
51.26  48.73 41.55 54.54 3.896  50.64  33.80* 
Total 
789 
50.82  49.17 49.74 46.90 3.350  43.55  146.46* 
Note: Statistically significant at 1% (*). 
 
More importantly, net discrimination , as tested by the  criterion for 
differences in attributes, is found to be statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance
] [ I ND
2 x
13 (Column 7): The high value of the   test shows that ethnic origin and 
discrimination are highly correlated. Hence, our data can not support the hypothesis of 
the independence of the two attributes.  
2 x
Moreover, we are interested in examining the sign pattern of our sample, and 
we have therefore performed the conditional sign test for symmetry
14:  Under the null 
hypothesis (symmetry), it can be: 
Either, 
 %, 50 ) /( 0 = + = I I I DG DA DG H  
Or, 
% 50 ) /( 0 = + = I I I DG DA DA H .  
In our case, the pattern outcome was always found to be in the same direction, i.e., the 
Greek favored proportion is always bigger than the Albanian favored proportion and 
we can thus reject symmetry (Table B, Appendix 1).  
Thereafter, we are interested in examining whether our four samples come 
from the same binomial population. Using pooled estimators, we have thus tested for, 
and accepted homogeneity, since: 
 
                                                 
13We had first to examine whether the ,  and   distributions are normal. We had 
therefore performed the -goodness of fit Kolmogorov-Smirnov test- and accepted the (null) hypothesis 
of normality (Table A, Appendix 1). 
] [ I DA ] [ I DG ] [ I ND
14For extensive discussions see Heckman and Siegelman (1993).  
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% 7 . 6 ) /( = + I I I DG DA DG ; % 3 . 93 ) /( = + I I I DG DA DA  
(Table C, Appendix 1).   
Turning to Table 1, in office jobs Albanians were found to face 30.3% 
(65.6%) equal treatment (net discrimination), which were the lower (higher) bounds 
across occupations: They respectively face 41.5% (50.6%), in shop sales, 53.4% 
(39.7%), in factory jobs, and 67.7% (24.1%), in restaurant and café services. Hence, 
regarding office vacancies, which can be considered as the white collar ingredient of 
our reference occupations, we may conclude that Albanians face higher occupational 
discrimination. However, regarding factory vacancies (which can be respectively seen 
as the blue collar occupation), Albanians seem to face higher net discrimination 
compared to restaurant and café vacancies.  
 
5.2 Insurance Coverage Registration 
At the second stage, discrimination is assigned whenever an employer refuses 
to register a potential employee with insurance coverage, on the first employment day. 
In order to identify discrimination, at this stage, we have concentrated on the equal 
treatment cases, as assigned at the first stage. Similarly, we have defined five 
outcomes: ,  , , , , where now  B U B E B DA B DG B ND = B refers to the insurance coverage 
stage. Moreover, we now need to define the outcome where firms refuse to inform 
whether they would register one, or both, candidate(s) with insurance coverage . 
Also, we need to define the outcome where firms refuse to register both 
candidates .
] [ B N
] [ B R
15   
In Table 2 we report our relevant probability results. Column (1) shows that in 
37.8% cases firms refused to inform whether they would register (with IKA), either 
one, or both, worker(s)   . Column (2) shows that in 19.6% cases firms refused 
to register both workers . Column (3) shows that in 42.4% cases at least one 







                                                 
15Let the probabilities of events indicated by: ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  . We 








I r E r P / = }, , , { B B B U R N r = B h U h P / =  ;  } , , , { B B B B ND DG DA E h= .  
Then,  if  the Greek and Albanian candidates receive equal treatment.  If  ,  the 
Albanian candidates face lower probability of being registered with IKA. The opposite occurs if 
. 
0 =
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candidates would be registered  . Column (5) shows that discrimination against 
Albanians   is 36.5%, which is also the net discrimination  (since 
discrimination against Greek  is 0%). Net discrimination  was found to be 




B DA P ] [
B ND P
] [
B DG P ] [ B ND
 
Table 2 Insurance Coverage Registrations - Probability Results (%) - 
 
                     Outcomes     
Occupations 
 




B N P  
(2) 
 
B R P  
(3) 
 
B U P  
(4) 
 
B E P  
(5) 
 
B DA P  
(6) 
 
B DG P  
(7) 
 









36.66 23.33 40.00 83.33 16.66  0  16.66  2 
Factories 
47 
19.14 8.510 72.34 73.52 26.47  0  26.47  9** 
Restaurant and Café Services 
84 
48.80 22.61 28.57 45.83 54.16  0  54.16  13* 
Shop Sales 
32 
37.50 25.00 37.50 50.00 50.00  0  50.00  6** 
Total 
193 
37.82 19.68 42.48 63.41 36.58  0  36.58  30* 
Note: Statistically significant at 1% (*), 5% (**). 
 
Note that, while at the first stage, in 49.7% cases both candidates faced equal 
access to interview calls , at the second stage both workers are offered insurance 
coverage  by 63.4%. This finding highlights that the outcome: equal chance of 
access to occupations, is by no means discrimination free. On the contrary, as it turns 
out, it obscures discriminatory treatment. To this end, interestingly, Greek candidates 






As it comes to occupations, in office jobs Albanians faced the lowest net 
discrimination rate 16.6%, while that rate was 26.4% in factories, 50.0% in shop sales, 
and 54.1% in restaurant and café services. At the same time office jobs faced the 
highest equal treatment (83.3%), followed by factories (73.5%), restaurant and café 
services (45.8%), and shop sales (50.0%). Consequently, even in low skilled 
vacancies, more prestigious jobs entailed lower insurance coverage discrimination, 
even though Albanians faced lower occupational access there. Also, in factories where 
accident risk is higher, insurance coverage discrimination was, as expected, lower 
compared to restaurant-café services and shop sales. 
                                                 
16 In most cases employers stated that employees must first accredit their skills, for a period, before 
they would be registered.  
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5.3 Wage Offers 
At the third stage we are interested in measuring differences in wages offered, 
across potential employees, and we similarly concentrate on the equal treatment 
outcomes assigned at the first stage. As it is reported in Table 3, we found that 
Albanians receive monthly wage contracts 8.8% below those of Greeks: Employers 
are willing to pay the Greek (Albanian) candidate 641.06€ (584.04€). It therefore 
seems that an ethnic penalty, of 57.02€ per month, applies. In order to further evaluate 
our measurements, we subsequently compare the wages offered with the (legally 
binding) minimum wages, as the latter are defined by the National General Collective 
Employment Agreement (N.G.C.E.A.).  
In Table 4 we present the minimum wages for unmarried employees and 
workers, in proportion to their work experience. Our candidates were unmarried and 
each had nine years of work experience.  Minimum wage records were however 
available for two periods, January to September 2006, and September 2006 to May 
2007, and because our experiment was conducted from May 2006 to January 2007, 
we used the average (minimum) wage rates of these two periods as a base of 
comparison. 
 
Table 3.Employers Wage Offers (€) – Discrimination Coefficient – 






































F – statistic 
Office Jobs 
16 
716.87 629.37  87.50    = d  12.20  13.35* 
Factories 
23 
673.91 607.39  66.52  = d 9.870  12.00* 
Restaurant and Café Services  
38 
599.21 562.89  36.31  = d 6.060  6.086* 
Shop Sales 
17 
618.82 557.00  61.82  = d 9.990  3.958* 
Total  
94 
641.06 584.04  57.02  = d 8.890  24.55* 
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Table 4.Minimum Wages (€) for Unmarried Employees & Workers as defined by the N.G.C.E.A. 
                     Work Experiences 
Periods 






I. January to September 2006  608.32  659.00   718.91  778.82 
II. September 2006 to May 2007  625.97  678.11  739.76  801.41 
Average I & II  617.14  668.55  729.33  790.11 
 
As it can be noted from the last rows of Tables 3 and 4, the mean wage offer 
for the Albanian candidates is found to be 5.3% below the no-experience minimum 
wage rate. Whilst, the Greek mean wage offer is found to fall between the no- 
experience and the three years of work-experience minimum wage rate. More 
importantly, we have estimated a variety of occupation-specific discrimination 
coefficients, ranging from 12.2%, in office jobs, to 6.0%, in restaurant and café 
services. Whilst, as our performed ANOVA F-statistic test assures, in all occupations 
the outcomes are found to be statistically significant at the 1% level (column 5 of 
Table 3).  
 
5.4 Regression Results 
Finally, we evaluate the effect of ethnicity on labour market discrimination, by 
means of our pair-wise (OLS) regressions (1)-(3) reported in Table 5. The equation’s 
(1) estimations show that the Greek candidates face a higher probability of being 
invited to an interview, which is a statistically significant outcome, in all occupations, 
at the 1% level (column 5). Moreover, the equation’s (2) estimations show that the 
Greek candidates face a higher probability of being registered with IKA, which, apart 
from office jobs and shop sales, is statistically significant at the1% level (column 5). 
Whilst, the equation’s (3) estimations show that the Greek candidates are also offered 
higher wage contracts, which, apart from shop sales, is a statistically significant 
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Note:  Statistically Significant at 1 %(*).  
 
6. Employers Elucidate Wage Discrimination 
In this section we report the findings of our second experiment, conducted in 
order to evaluate to which extent the taste, statistical, and profit maximization-
compatible hypotheses, may consistently interpret our correspondence test’s results 
regarding wage discrimination. For that experiment, we have utilized an indirect 
approach as follows. 
Those employers who had invited both candidates for interview were 
telephoned, we told them that we are engaged in a research project, and they were 
asked to rationalize (if they wish so) the factors which were responsible for wage 
discrimination, already evidenced in their sector, by choosing among alternative 
(proposed) causations. Since the interviewed employers had themselves already 
decided the outcome of our correspondence test regarding wage discrimination, our 
aim at this instance was to implicitly make them bring in to light the scope of reasons 
they did so. Of course, our interviews were applied without revealing to employers 
either their participation in the correspondence test or in the current experiment.  
Specifically, after we had introduced to them the “fact”: based on a current 
university research conducted to your sector, regarding male Greeks and Albanians, 
having the same age, equal qualifications and experience, Albanians were found to 
face wage discrimination, employers were asked to confirm or not the following 
propositions (see, e.g., Appendix 2).  
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Proposition 1: Do you believe that the Greeks’ higher wages come from dislike 
against Albanians?  
Proposition 2: Do you believe that the Albanians’ lower wages come from ambiguities 
concerning their productivity? 
Proposition 3: Do you believe that the Albanians’ lower wages is a firms’ profit 
maximization strategy, apart from what it is entailed in Proposition 2?  
In Table A (Appendix 2) we report the received probability results regarding 
proposition 1. While the “dislike” against Albanians is found to account for the 24.2% 
(column 2), it had nothing to do with wage discrimination in all other (75.5%) cases 
(column 3). As tested by the   criterion for differences in percentages, this difference 
is found to be statistically significant at the 1% level (column 4).   
z
In Table B (Appendix 2) we respectively report the probability results for     
Proposition 2. Although, based on our introductory “fact,” Greeks and Albanians had 
equal human capital, there were still beliefs amongst employers (19.6%) that 
ambiguities’ concerning Albanians’ productivity can be a factor for wage 
discrimination (column 2). However, the employers’ vast majority (84.3%) does not 
seem to believe that (column 3). This difference is similarly found to be statistically 
significant (column 4).  
In Table C we report the probability results assigned for Proposition 3. 
Interestingly, approximately three out of four employers (73.6%) seem to believe that 
wage discrimination is a firms’ profit strategy, apart from what is entailed in 
propositions 2 (column 2). That difference as well found to be statistically significant 
(column 4).  
In Table D we report the probability results concerning how employers (as 
they had effectively been asked to) weigh the three hypotheses/explanations of wage 
discrimination. Employers were found to “put the blame” on taste discrimination by 
7.8% (column 1), on statistical discrimination by 9.6% (column 2), while their vast 
majority, on profit strategies by 84.4% (column 3).  Focusing on the two most 
preferable, we have subsequently tested their significance. We conclude that profit 
strategies, rather than statistical discrimination, is the factor which employers accuse 
most for wage discrimination (column 4). 
Last, but not least, in Table E we report the probability results concerning how 
employers weigh their second best choice. To that end, employers were found to “put 
the blame” on statistical discrimination, by 82.8% (column 2), on profit strategies, by 
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15.9% (column 3), and on taste discrimination, by only 2.4% (column 1). Hence, 
interestingly, the statistical hypothesis of wage discrimination was found to be the 
employers’ (statistically significant) second best explanation (column 4). Moreover, 
for robustness, employers were asked by “how much” prefer their first best choice 
(Table D), to their second best one (Table E). Table F displays that the employers’ 
vast majority (88.4%) prefers by “very much” their first best choice, while only 
11.5% prefers it by “quite a lot,” a difference which is also found to be statistically 
significant (Table 4).   
 
7. Conclusions  
In January 2005 Greece adopted the two European anti-discrimination 
Directives. The purpose of those directives was to lay down a framework for 
combating discrimination, as regards employment and occupation, on the grounds of 
religion or beliefs, disability, age or sexual orientation. The Directives make clear that 
people affected by discrimination should have adequate means of legal protection and 
an effective right of redress in order to be able to get things put rights. Presumably, 
therefore, workplace equality has currently the backing of the law. However, a history 
of discrimination can’t turn overnight. The law on its own can chance very little of it. 
In this study we investigate the extent of ethnic discrimination in the labour 
market using field data. We have used correspondence testing to examine directly 
whether ethnic discrimination currently exists in the Greek labour market. In 
particular, we are interested in whether low skilled Albanians face discriminatory 
treatment compared to -equal human capital endowed- Greeks. In previous studies, 
field experiments have been also used to test for discrimination in hiring. In this 
paper, while we also focus on the hiring process, we have extended the scope of 
analysis by gathering information on insurance coverage registrations, as well as on 
wage offers. Moreover, we have conducted a second experiment, by indirectly asking 
those who are effectively deciding the discriminatory outcomes (i.e., the employers) 
to “put the blame” on particular reasons.  
The conclusion of our both experiments is that ethnic discrimination in the 
Greek labour market is still significant. According to the International Labour 
Organization measurement standards, we have estimated that Albanians face 43.5% 
less chance of access to occupations. Moreover, concentrating on the 49.7% equal 
chance (of access to occupations) cases, we argue that Albanians face 36.5% less 
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chance of being registered with insurance coverage, while their potential wage 
contracts are 8.8% below those of Greeks and 5.3% below the legal minimum wage. 
Interestingly, employers themselves “put the blame” for that, on profit strategies (by 
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Table (A) Invitation to Interviews - Goodness of fit Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test - 
                Test Value 
 
Outcomes 
Kolmogorov – Smirnov  
test 
 
I E   0.269 
I DA   0.344 
I DG   0.329 
I ND   0.332 
Note: Statistically insignificant.  
  
 
Table (B) Invitation to Interviews - Conditional Sign Test - 
Conditional 
Discrimination 














Note: The conditional event is the no discrimination outcome of only one tester.  
 
 
Table (C) Invitation to Interviews - Test of Homogeneity with Pooled Estimator - 
                           Occupations 
Ethnic  
Discrimination 
Pooled Estimators  Homogeneity 
test 
 
I DA   0.933 





Table (D) Insurance Coverage Registration - Goodness of fit Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test - 
                Test Value 
 
Outcomes 
Kolmogorov – Smirnov  
test 
 
B E   0.251 
B DA   0.131 
B ND   0.131 
 
 
Table (E) Insurance Coverage Registration – Conditional Sign Test - 
Conditional  
Discrimination 
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Appendix 2 
 
Experiment 2 – Questionnaire – Propositions - 
Fact 
 
Based on a current university research conducted to your sector, regarding male Greeks and 
Albanians, having the same age, equal qualifications and experiences, Albanians were found to face 
wage discrimination. 
 
Proposition1. Do you believe Greeks higher wages come from dislike against Albanians?   
(a) I don’t know (b) Yes (c) No                                                                                            
                   
Proposition2.  Do you believe Albanians’ lower wages come from ambiguities concerning their 
productivity?  
(a) I don’t know (b) Yes (c)  
 
Proposition3. Do you believe Albanians’ lower wages is a firms’ profit maximization strategy, apart 
from what it is entailed in proposition 2?  




I. Wage discrimination against Albanians is due to: 
(a) I don’t know 
(b) Dislike?                                                                                                                           
(c) Ambiguities concerning their productivity?                                              
(d) Firms’ profit strategy, apart from (c)?                                                                              
 
II. Which is your second best choice: (a)? (b) ? (c) ? (d)? 
 
III. Would you prefer your first to the second best choice by: 




Table (A) Employers Interview Probability Results - Proposition 1 - 





Equal Treatment Cases 
(1) 
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Table (B) Employers Interview Probability Results - Proposition 2 – 





Equal Treatment Cases 
(1) 
 
























































Note: The z test is carried out between the "yes" and "no" outcomes.Statistically significant at 1% (*). 
  
 
Table (C) Employers Interview Probability Results – Proposition 3 – 





Equal Treatment Cases 
(1) 
 




























































Note: The z test is carried out between the "yes" and "no" outcomes.Statistically significant at 1% (*), statistically 
significant at 5% (**). 
 
 
Table (D) Employers Interview Probability Results – Conclusive Remark I - 






































































Note: The ″I don’t know″ outcome is zero in all occupations. The z test is carried out between the most preferable 
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Table (E) Employers Interview Probability Results – Conclusive Remark II - 





































































Note:The ″I don’t know″ outcome is zero in all occupations. The z test is carried out between the two most 
preferable outcomes. Statistically significant at 1% (*). 
 
 
Table (F) Employers Interview Probability Results – Conclusive Remark III - 



































































Note: The″I don’t know″ outcome is zero in all occupations. The z test is carried out between the most preferable 
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Figure 1 
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Curriculum Vitae  
First Name: Greek/Albanian 
Last Name: Greek/Albanian 
Ethnicity: Greek/Albanian 
Marital Status: Unmarried  
Date of Birth: .../.../1978 
Address: Location 
Telephone: Mobile 




Certificate of Greek high school in 1996 - Location 
Basic Knowledge of English and P/C 




From August 1998 to January 2000         Appointment/ Firm 
From March 2000 to March 2003            Appointment/ Firm 
From April 2003 to …2006/7                  Appointment/ Firm 
 






First Name Albanian/Greek          Last Name Albanian/Greek 
 
Date of Birth .../.../1978 







Appointment/ Firm      February1998- November1999 
Appointment/ Firm      December1999-July 2004 




Certificate of Greek high school in 1996 - Location 
English Basic Knowledge 




Military Services Carried Out in 1998 
Hobbies Music, Cinema, Sports    
Personality Industrious, Efficient 
Driving License  
  29